



Thy Brother Came with Subtlety: How a Cause  
of Action Against Companies Who Leak Data  





In the digital age, perhaps more than ever, knowledge is power.  The 
global economy generates a staggering amount of data every year.
1
  In 2011, 
enough data sprang forth from global commerce—1.8 zetabytes—that if the 
data were a single high-definition movie, that movie would take a person 47 
million years to watch.
2
  This amount is expected to double every year.
3
  
Amidst such a large amount of information leaks are inevitable, with some 
being “personal information” such as a name, social security number, 
driver’s license, a bank or credit account number, medical information, or 
health insurance information.
4
  The data flood is everywhere and the levies 
cannot hold.  When personal data is leaked, that victim should, in limited 
circumstances, have a remedy against the company that allowed the leak to 
happen. 
Such data leaks are becoming commonplace.  On New Years Day 2014, 
users of the smartphone application—commonly referred to as an “app”—
Snapchat,
5
 woke to the news that phone numbers and usernames associated 
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 1.  Demystifying Big Data: A Practical Guide to Transforming the Business of Government, 
TECHAMERICA FOUND. FED. BIG DATA COMM’N 9 (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.techamerica.org/Docs/fileManager.cfm?f=techamerica-bigdatareport-final.pdf.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.29(g)(1)–(5) (West 2012) (defining personal 
information in a data breach notification law).  
 5.  Snapchat is an application that allows users to send photographs to other users that may be 
seen for only a limited amount of time.  
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with 4.6 million accounts had been leaked.
6
  A few weeks earlier, the retail 
giant Target announced a leak of credit card and other information that may 
affect up to 110 million customers.
7
  In February 2013, in response to the 
suicide of Internet activist Aaron Swartz, the hacker-activist group known as 
Anonymous hacked into the Federal Reserve Web site and posted online 
personal information about bank executives including login information, 
credentials, IP addresses, and contact information.
8
  A few months earlier, 
the group claimed it had hacked the laptop of an FBI agent and gained 
access to the personal data of over 1 million Apple users.
9
  Though the FBI 
disputed the claim,
10
 the news sent chills down the spines of millions of 
iPhone, iPad, iMac, and iTunes users worldwide.  A small Florida 
publishing company called Blue Toad that creates apps for Apple products 
revealed that it was likely the unwitting source of the information gained by 
Anonymous.
11
  Many app developers use Apple’s Unique Device Identifiers 
(UDIDs) to help keep track of their users, and Blue Toad is no different.
12
  
Blue Toad believed that hackers gained access to servers where the company 
stored customer information, including the UDIDs, and stole the 
information.
13
  Anonymous used the data to accuse—falsely, it appears—the 
                                                          
 6.  Brian Fung, A Snapchat Security Breach Affects 4.6 Million Users. Did Snapchat Drag Its 
Feet on a Fix?, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/01/01/a-snapchat-security-breach-affects-4-6-million-users-did-snapchat-drag-its-
feet-on-a-fix. 
 7.  See Tiffany Hsu, Target Traces Data Breach to Credentials Stolen From Vendor, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-target-data-
breach-vendor-20140129,0,8026.story#axzz2sGkyx68S (reporting that cyberthieves accessed 
information from as many as 40 million credit cards and names, addresses, and email addresses of 
another 70 million customers). 
 8.  Andres Jauregui, Anonymous OpLastResort Claims Hack on Government Site, Posts 4,000 
Bank Exec Credentials, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 4, 2013, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/anonymous-oplastresort-hacks-government-posts-bank-
credential_n_2615605.html.  
 9.  Matthew Shaer, Apple, FBI Play Down Alleged Anonymous Hack, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/2012/0905/Apple-FBI-
play-down-alleged-Anonymous-hack.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Nicole Perlroth, Company Says It, Not F.B.I., Was Hacking Victim, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/technology/company-says-it-not-fbi-was-hacking-
victim.html?_r=0; Kerry Sanders & Bob Sullivan, Exclusive: The Real Source of Apple Device IDs 
Leaked by Anonymous Last Week, REDTAPE CHRONICLES ON NBCNEWS (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/10/13781440-exclusive-the-real-source-of-apple-device-
ids-leaked-by-anonymous-last-week?lite.  
 12.  See Sanders & Sullivan, supra note 11 (explaining that researchers discovered during 2011 
that many app developers use Apple’s UDIDs to keep track of users). 
 13.  Id. 
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federal government of spying on its own citizens.
14
  Anonymous uses data 
leaks to make political statements, but as far as is known, they have yet to 
visit actual harm on anyone, such as by using that personally identifiable 
information to steal a person’s identity. 
Journalist Jeff Jarvis believes that advancing technology is requiring 
society to answer questions it may not yet be prepared to answer.
15
  He 
wrote: “Technology is forcing us to question centuries-old assumptions 
about the roles of the individual and society: our rights, privileges, powers, 
responsibilities, concerns, and prospects.”
16
  In the legal world, courts on 
every level are struggling with how to apply existing law to new and ever-
changing technology.
17
  For example, a judge in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently tossed out most of a suit filed 




  The fired employee 
discovered the day after her firing that the company had accessed her 
LinkedIn account, changed the password, and replaced her name and 
photograph with those of her replacement.
20
  She claimed that the company 
violated federal computer hacking laws by transferring the profile to her 
replacement.
21
  However, after dismissing the federal claims, the court chose 
to use its supplemental jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s state law claims, 
including one for conversion, indicating on some level that a LinkedIn 
account may be property.
22
  In another instance of a court grappling with 
                                                          
 14.  Id.  Ironically, Anonymous could support this position fairly easily without relying on false 
accusations.  See Mike Masnick, The U.S. Government Today Has More Data on the Average 
American Than the Stazi Did on East Germans, TECHDIRT (Oct. 3, 2012, 1:13 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121003/10091120581/us-government-today-has-more-data-
average-american-than-stasi-did-east-germans.shtml. 
 15.  JEFF JARVIS, PUBLIC PARTS: HOW SHARING IN THE DIGITAL AGE IMPROVES THE WAY WE 
WORK AND LIVE 9 (Simon & Schuster eds., 1st ed. 2011). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Mike Tolson, Chief Justice Roberts: Technology Among Top Issues for Court, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Oct. 17, 2012, 11:22 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Chief-Justice-Roberts-Court-not-so-politicized-3957626.php (reporting on an 
informal chat by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts at Rice University concerning some 
of the most difficult issues facing the Court).  
 18.  LinkedIn is an online social networking Web site designed to cater to professionals.  It bills 
itself as “the world’s largest professional network on the Internet in over 200 countries and 
territories.”  See LINKEDIN, www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 19.  Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013); Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Judge Tosses Fired Employee’s Computer Hacking Claim Over Takeover of Her LinkedIn 
Account, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 10, 2012, 5:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_ 
tosses_fired_employees_computer_fraud_claim_over_takeover_linkedin.  
 20.  Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at *9. 
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technological issues, the judge in the high-profile Treyvon Martin murder 
case ruled in 2012 that she would not issue a gag order to prevent the 
defendant’s counsel from using social media and blogging to comment on 
the case.
23
  It is no wonder that U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Roberts has said that technology and its application to the law is one of the 
most difficult issues facing the Court today.
24
 
Meanwhile, companies have long seen the utility of gathering 
knowledge about their customers.
25
  They collect data such as names, 
addresses, credit card numbers, usernames, passwords, and even Social 
Security numbers for a variety of reasons, sometimes even to create 
revenue.
26
  Companies like BlueKai, Rapleaf, Invidi, and eXelate are adept 
at measuring clicks, swipes, mouseovers, and voice commands through the 
use of digital tracking tools, such as cookies, for the purpose of selling that 
information to other companies.
27
  This information has value not just to the 
company holding it, but also to those seeking information about potential 
customers.  For instance, if a small business owner wanted to figure out the 
best place to open a new pet store, the owner could buy a marketing report 
about a designated area.  The report might reveal which city blocks get the 
most foot or car traffic from people whose Web browsing history reveals 
that they own pets.
28
 
As technology improves, companies gather more and more information.  
For example, IBM owns a patent on a system using radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) technology that would begin collecting data on a 
customer the moment they enter a store,
29
 the idea apparently being that 
                                                          
 23.  Rene Stutzman, Judge Denies Gag Order in George Zimmerman Murder Case, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Oct. 29, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/trayvon-martin/os-
george-zimmerman-gag-order-decision-20121029,0,813572.story.  
 24.  Tolson, supra note 17. 
 25.  See, e.g., New Internet, Mobile Technologies and Impact on Public Policy: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Chris Babel, Chief Executive Officer of TRUSTe), 
available at 2012 WL 2314267 (testifying before Congress that “[t]oday’s companies are racing 
ahead to harness the aggregate power of vast databases of personal data.  Personal data is a critical 
asset for businesses and leveraging that data can yield tangible benefits for both business and 
consumers.  For example, by leveraging its clinical and cost data, Kaiser Permanente was able to 
attribute 27,000 deaths to Vioxx and pull the drug off the market.”). 
 26.  See David Goldman, Your Phone Company Is Selling Your Personal Data, CNN MONEY 
(Nov. 1, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/technology/verizon_att_sprint_ 
tmobile_privacy/index.htm (explaining how Verizon Wireless recently changed its privacy policy to 
allow it to sell customer’s location, Web browsing, and video watching data).  
 27.  See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS 
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 4–5 (2011). 
 28.   Goldman, supra note 26. 
 29.  ROBERT VAMOSI, WHEN GADGETS BETRAY US: THE DARK SIDE OF OUR INFATUATION 
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rather than wait for a person to scan a customer loyalty card, the RFID can 
instantly recognize the customer and direct them to discounted or previously 
purchased items.
30
  Such technological improvements, combined with the 
variety of incentives for the companies, have virtually ensured that customer 
tracking will only increase. 
The practice of gathering all of this information brings up serious 
privacy concerns.
31
  When people are surveyed after being informed of the 
extent of data mining they have likely been subjected to, they often say they 
are “creeped out.”
32
  It engenders distrust in companies and in government, 
which has allowed this spying to go on.
33
  According to Joseph Turow, 
Robert Lewis Shayon Professor of Communication at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, “when companies 
track people without their knowledge, sell their data without letting them 
know what they are doing or securing their permission, and then use those 
data to decide which of those people are targets or waste, we have a serious 
social problem.”
34
  Understanding how privacy has changed as a legal 
concept in modern times is something that has been difficult for courts to 
sort through.
35
  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor intimated in a 
concurring opinion in 2012 that a person’s expectation of privacy might 
have changed due to advancing technology.
36
  She called into question the 
premise that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily given to third parties.
37
 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course 
of carrying out mundane tasks.  People disclose the phone numbers that 
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and 
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet 
service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they 
purchase to online retailers.
38
 
                                                          
WITH NEW TECHNOLOGIES 127 (2011).   
 30.  Id. at 129.  
 31.  See generally Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 283 (2003) (discussing privacy problems inherent in the digital age).  
 32.  TUROW, supra note 27, at 7. 
 33.  Id. at 7–8.  
 34.  Id. at 7.  
 35.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (discussing a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking).  
 36.  Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
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However, whether these companies are violating a person’s expectation 
of privacy is not the subject of this Comment.  Instead, it is concerned that 
companies possessing this personal data may carelessly create risk.  The risk 
of identity theft naturally follows from data leaks including personally 
identifiable information.  Some commentators have already called for courts 
to recognize a company’s duty to protect customer data.
39
  In fact, courts 
have made minor steps in that direction.
40
  This has led some to conclude 
that protecting data is “no longer just good business practice[,] [i]t is 
becoming a legal obligation.”
41
  At a minimum, if companies are going to 
continue to allow personal information to fall into the wrong hands, it should 
fall to those companies to make those adversely affected whole. 
Nearly every state in the union has enacted notification laws that create 
an explicit duty that companies must notify customers as soon as they 
become aware that a data leak has occurred.
42
  The intention of the state 
legislatures may simply be to ensure that those people who have been the 
victim of a data leak have time to take necessary measures like canceling 
their credit cards and changing their passwords.  But that puts the entire onus 
on the victim to rectify the situation, ignores the inconvenience and loss to 
those victims, and does little to encourage companies to protect customer 
data with these statutes.  The recent and continuing data leaks suggest the 
current statutory framework is insufficient to prevent future leaks.
43
  As 
                                                          
 39.  See Derek A. Bishop, Comment, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty 
to Protect Collections of Personal Information?, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7, 25 (2006) 
(arguing that because data theft has become increasingly foreseeable, companies ought to make it a 
practice to safeguard customer information in order to avoid liability).  
 40.  See infra Part III.B.  
 41.  Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Emerging Law of Data Security: A Focus on the Key Legal 
Trends, in 1 NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW 13, 24 (2008). 
 42.  Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information Privacy and 
Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 64 n.3 (2011) 
(noting that “only four states do not have a data breach notification law: Alabama, Kentucky, New 
Mexico and South Dakota”).  See also Scott Berinato, CSO Disclosure Series: Data Breach 
Notification Laws, State by State, CSO SECURITY AND RISK (Feb. 12, 2008), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/221322/cso-disclosure-series-data-breach-notification-laws-state-
by-state (featuring an interactive map of all states that have enacted data breach notification laws).  
 43.  See Conor Shine, Zappos in Damage-control Mode After Computer Security Breach, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (Jan. 16, 2012, 4:58 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jan/16/zappos-
damage-control-mode-after-computer-security (online retailer Zappos.com announced a security 
breach involving the personal information of 24 million customers); Adam Samson, LinkedIn 
Confirms Data Breach, FOX BUSINESS (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2012/06/06/linkedin-investigating-report-major-data-breach 
(professional networking site LinkedIn admitted to a breach following reports that 6.5 million 
passwords hit the Internet); Yahoo Probes Report of Password Security Breach, INFOSECURITY (July 
12, 2012), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/26945/yahoo-probes-report-of-password-
security-breach (Yahoo! responded to claims that a hacker stole e-mails and passwords from Yahoo! 
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more and more individuals shift their personal information to cloud-based 
data storage systems,
44
 the threat of identity theft or other malicious uses of 
data shows significant signs of growth. 
Courts recognizing a company’s duty to protect customer data and 
imposing liability in limited cases would provide a strong incentive for 
companies to spend resources on protecting data that could potentially be put 
to illicit use in the wrong hands.  But courts have been reluctant to reach 
such a holding, as it would expose large companies to massive lawsuits.
45
  
With the millions of customers affected by such leaks, it is not difficult to 
imagine a large company going bankrupt due to a single data leak unless the 
liability is somehow limited.  Some have suggested the best answer would 
be the federal government stepping in and enacting a data breach notification 
law.
46
  However, similar state laws are now ubiquitous
47
 and have failed to 
plug such leaks.  Barring an unforeseen event, there simply does not seem to 
be the political will for Congress to enact a bill that places such a burden on 
companies.
48
  Therefore, the solution should come from the judiciary. 
The first step should be for courts to recognize that companies that 
collect and store personal data of their customers have a duty to protect that 
data.  This finding of an affirmative duty could stem from a special 
relationship or from finding that the company has undertaken affirmative 
steps to provide protection as a service.
49
  From there, courts should 
                                                          
Voices, a software that enables users to post videos and slideshows). 
 44.  See Arif Mohamed, A History of Cloud Computing, COMPUTER WEEKLY (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/A-history-of-cloud-computing (noting that cloud-based 
computing has been around since the 1960s.  J.C.R. Licklider, the man credited by some as the 
inventor of cloud computing, foresaw it as a way for “everyone on the globe to be interconnected 
and accessing programs and data at any site, from anywhere[.]”); see, e.g., Sean Ludwig, Cisco: 
Global Cloud Traffic Will Increase 12-fold by 2015, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 29, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2011/11/29/cisco-global-cloud-traffic (estimating that cloud-based computer 
traffic will increase 12 times by 2015).   
 45.  See Shine, supra note 43 (online retailer Zappos’s data leak affected 24 million customers); 
Samson, supra note 43 (LinkedIn admitted to data breach that affected 6.5 million users). 
 46.  See Amanda Draper, Comment, Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive Data Leaks with a 
Stricter Nationwide Breach-Notification Law, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 697–701 (2007) 
(arguing that such a law would offer the customer an opportunity to fix the problem while 
maintaining the company’s ability to conduct business).  
 47.  Burdon, supra note 42, at 64 n.3. 
 48.  Despite persistent calls for federal legislation, Congress has not passed such a law.  In 
2005, Microsoft Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary Brad Smith 
recommended in a position paper that the federal government enact privacy legislation to protect 
consumers.  See Brad Smith, Protecting Consumers and the Marketplace: The Need for Federal 
Privacy Legislation, MICROSOFT (Nov. 2005), 
https://www.cdt.org/privacy/20051103microsoftprivacy.pdf.  
 49.  See infra Part III.C.  
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recognize a negligence cause of action against companies who allow 
customers’ personal information to leak.  However, courts should limit 
liability in several ways.  First, courts should avoid a problem of unlimited 
liability by requiring the plaintiff to make a showing of actual harm—such 
as theft of identity—and that the data leak is the proximate cause of the 
harm.
50
  Courts should further limit the liability by applying a 
reasonableness standard that protects those companies making reasonable 
efforts to secure the sensitive customer data.
51
  Part II of this Comment will 
discuss the crime of identity theft, how it has changed in the modern era, and 
how the law has attempted to adapt along the way.  Part III will discuss the 
reasons why courts should recognize a duty to protect data and how courts 
can limit the cause of action by requiring only reasonable efforts on behalf 
of the business and proof of actual harm by the plaintiff. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. History 
“And he said, Thy brother came with subtlety, and hath taken away thy 
blessing.”
52
  Isaac, son of Abraham, spoke those words in the Holy Bible, to 
Esau following what some call the first documented instance of identity 
theft.
53
  The story goes: Jacob, seeking the blessing of the firstborn, with the 
help of his mother, covered his hands and neck with ram skins so as to 
resemble the hairy Esau.
54
  He visited his blind father on his deathbed 
pretending to be the firstborn Esau.
55
  Isaac blessed Jacob saying, “Let 
people serve thee, and nations bow down to thee: be lord over thy brethren, 
and let thy mother’s sons bow down to thee: cursed be every one that curseth 
thee, and blessed be he that blesseth thee.”
56
  Thereafter, Jacob became 
Isaac’s primary heir, and Esau was left to swear revenge.
57
 
Identity thieves today use some of the same tactics.  They strike with 
subtlety and deception to fool people into giving them what rightfully 
                                                          
 50.  See infra Part III.F.  
 51.  See infra Part III.E. 
 52.  Genesis 27:35 (King James). 
 53.  Jake Stroup, A Brief History of Identity Theft: How We Got Where We Are, ABOUT.COM, 
http://idtheft.about.com/od/identitytheft101/a/A-Brief-History-Of-Identity-Theft.htm (last visit Mar. 
19, 2014).  
 54.  Genesis 27:16 (King James). 
 55.  Id. at 18–19. 
 56.  Id. at 29. 
 57.  Id. at 1–37. 
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belongs to another.  Identity thieves use others’ personal information to 
allow them to commit a variety of illegal acts, usually fraud.
58
  Assistant 
United States Attorney Sean B. Hoar defines identity theft as the theft of 
information such as a name, date of birth, Social Security number, or credit 
card number.
59
  Identity theft is estimated to be one of the fastest growing 
crimes in the country.
60
  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) said that 
forty-two percent of its complaints filed during the year 2000 had to do with 
identity theft.
61
  A 2003 FTC study estimated that 9.9 million Americans had 
personal information stolen in 2002 and found an exponential increase in 
information theft between 2000 and 2002.
62
 
Despite the ever-growing threat, people are voluntarily putting more and 
more of their personal information online because of the tremendous 
benefits that can await those willing to disregard privacy in favor of 
sharing.
63
  Journalist Jeff Jarvis wrote: “Because I am public, I have made 
new friends and reconnected with old ones.  I have received work and made 
money—including this book and the last.  I have tested ideas, spread those 
ideas, and gotten credit (and blame).”
64
  It’s not just outgoing young 




All around the world, we are already living increasingly public lives, 
sharing our thoughts, photos, videos, locations, purchases, and 
recommendations on Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, Foursquare, 
and platforms offered by other companies in the sharing industry.  
These people aren’t sharing all this because they’re reckless 
exhibitionists, mass narcissists, senseless drunks (well, not usually), or 
insane.  They are doing it for a reason: They realize rewards from being 
                                                          
 58.  See Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423, 
1429 (2001) (discussing the adoption of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), designed to prevent “fraudulent creation, use, or transfer of identification 
documents” and the theft or criminal use of personal information). 
 59.  Id. at 1423. 
 60.  Id. at 1423–24. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Jennifer Lynch, Note, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods and Their 
Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 261 (2005) (“Identity 
theft is one of the fastest growing crimes in the United States.  A broad survey commissioned by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in September 2003, estimated that 9.9 million Americans had had 
their personal information stolen in the prior year, collectively costing businesses $47.6 billion and 
consumers $5.0 billion.”). 
 63.  See JARVIS, supra note 15, at 1–4. 
 64.  Id. at 2–3. 
 65.  Id. at 8. 
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open and making the connections technology now affords.
66
 
Meanwhile, companies are gathering, creating, and using more data than 
ever.
67
  The advertising industry is “guiding one of history’s most massive 
stealth efforts in social profiling.”
68
  It includes computers, networks, and 
software “as well as the data, messages, and information that is typically 
recorded on, processed by, communicated via, stored in, shared by, 
transmitted, or received from such information systems.”
69
  The information 
companies’ collection includes “financial information, personal information, 
tax-related records, employee information, transaction information, and 
trade secret and other confidential information.”
70
 
Many companies have begun to engage in the process known as data 
mining, either in-house or by hiring data brokers.
71
  Data mining is the 
process of gathering, analyzing, and sharing an Internet user’s online and 
offline behaviors, including purchasing records and tastes.
72
  For an example 
of how data mining works and how quickly the information gathered can be 
put to work, look no further than the 2012 presidential election.  A 
community college student and supporter of President Barack Obama told 
the New York Times that after visiting mittromney.com, he almost 
immediately started seeing advertisements on other Web sites asking him to 
donate money to Mitt Romney’s campaign.
73
  Turow has written that 
although many people may actually enjoy being targeted for advertising, 
there should be concern over the intrusion.
74
  “Every day most if not all 
Americans who use the [I]nternet, along with hundreds of millions of other 
users from all over the planet, are being quietly peeked at, poked, analyzed, 
and tagged as they move through the online world.”
75
 
                                                          
 66.  Id. at 9. 
 67.  See Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 19 (“[I]n today’s business environment, virtually all of 
a company’s daily transactions and all of its key records are created, used, communicated, and stored 
in electronic form using networked computer technology.”). 
 68.  TUROW, supra note 27, at 1.  
 69.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 27. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Natasha Singer, The Data-Mining Industry Kicks Off a Public Relations Campaign, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Oct. 15, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/the-
data-mining-industry-kicks-off-a-public-relations-campaign/.  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Natasha Singer & Charles Duhigg, Tracking Voters’ Clicks Online to Try to Sway Them, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/us/politics/tracking-clicks-online-
to-try-to-sway-voters.html?ref=politics&_r=0.   
 74.  TUROW, supra note 27, at 1–2. 
 75.  Id. at 2. 
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Companies, unlike political campaigns, often gather all of this data in 
order to reduce costs and increase productivity.
76
  When a company collects 
information on customers, it now stores that information in a database on a 
server.
77
  It “greatly enhances the potential for unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, and alteration” of customer data.
78
  A hacker who gains access to 
that database suddenly might have enough information to steal hundreds of 
thousands of identities, or to sell that information to others who might seek 
to do so.  Several large, high-profile data leaks have occurred in the past 
several years.
79
  In response, the victims of such data leaks are alleging that 
they have a cause of action against the companies in the possession of such 
data and are filing complaints seeking damages.
80
  The lawsuits allege that 
the named company had a duty to protect the data and that the company 
acted negligently by releasing it or failing to prevent thieves from accessing 
it.
81
  Although these lawsuits raise questions of statutory and contract law, 
the primary focus of this Comment is the claim that the companies have a 
common law duty to protect customers’ personal information. 
B. Identity Theft in the Digital Age 
Since the advent of the Internet, identity theft has gone high-tech.  Not 
so long ago, people could reliably combat identity theft by taking such 
simple steps as shredding their credit card statements before disposing of 
them.
82
  Identity thieves dove into dumpsters, stole purses or wallets, or 
opened mail before owners could check their mailboxes.
83
  Thieves today 
                                                          
 76.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 19. 
 77.  See Crunching the Numbers: Banks Know a Lot More About Their Customers.  That 
Information May be Valuable in More Ways Than One, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21554743 (taking an in-depth look at how companies are 
attempting to handle and use the massive amounts of data they collect and store in databases).   
 78.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 19. 
 79.  Snapchat leaked 4.6 million users’ contact information in 2014.  Fung, supra note 6.  
Target’s security breach compromised 40 million customers’ credit card information in 2013.  Hsu, 
supra note 7.  In 2012, Zappos.com, LinkedIn, and Yahoo.com all experienced breaches impacting 
millions of customers or users.  See Shine, supra note 43; Samson, supra note 43; Yahoo probes 
report of password security breach, supra note 43.   
 80.  See, e.g., Complaint, Szpyrka v. LinkedIn Corp., No. CV 12 3088 HRL, 2012 WL 2169325 
(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012); Complaint, Lawrence v. Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3_12CV00355, 2012 WL 
2839874 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2012). 
 81.  Complaint, Szpyrka, supra note 80; Complaint, Lawrence, supra note 80. 
 82.  See, e.g., What to Shred and When to Shred it, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU (Apr. 8, 2008), 
http://canton.bbb.org/article/what-to-shred-and-when-to-shred-it-4210 (giving tips on what 
documents to shred to help avoid identity theft).  
 83.  Stephanie Byers, Note, The Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Stolen, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 141, 
143 (2001).  
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often use techniques like watching people enter their credit card numbers 
into a phone, pretexting—which is either calling a financial institution 
pretending to be a customer or calling a person pretending to be a financial 
institution—or simply becoming an employee of a large company that tracks 
consumer data, such as a bank.
84
 
The digital age has only increased the avenues potential identity thieves 
may use to gather a person’s information.  A recent study by Miniwatts 
Marketing Group found that Internet usage grew during the last eleven years 
by over 100% in every region on the planet, with the most dramatic growth 
found in Africa (2,988.4%) and the Middle East (2,244.8%).
85
  The slowest 
growing area, North America, still grew by 152.6%.
86
  Meanwhile, the threat 
so-called “cyber criminals” pose to the private sector continues to grow.
87
  A 
firm that specializes in anti-malware believes that 2011 was the worst year 
ever for security breaches.
88
  Malware refers to harmful computer programs 
like viruses, Trojan horses, tracking software, etc.  Nevertheless, people put 
more and more of themselves online.
89
  Industry experts expect cloud-based 
computing to grow exponentially in the next three years,
90
 but, security is 
not growing nearly as fast.  A 2011 survey found that 66% of businesses 
have not implemented any data-loss prevention tools.
91
  Considering the rise 
                                                          
 84.  See Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for 
Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who Is Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. 
REV. 847, 850–51 (2005) (“The rise in identity theft has occurred in a large part because of the 
increased sophistication and anonymity of identity thieves.”). 
 85.  INTERNET WORLD USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).  The Miniwatts Marketing 
group compared data on Internet usage published by Nielsen Online, the International 
Telecommunications Union and other sources with census data in order to come up with its figures.  
Id.  Miniwatts Marketing Group is a Limited Liability Company formed in 1997 to research Internet 
use for marketing purposes. MINIWATTS MARKETING GROUP, 
http://www.miniwatts.com/about_us.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).  
 86.  INTERNET WORLD USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).   
 87.  See Cybersecurity: Responding to the Threat of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Statement 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. (Apr. 12, 
2011), (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir., Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyber-
crime-and-terrorism (“Cyber criminal threats to the U.S. result in significant economic losses.”). 
 88.  Privacy Violations Biggest Security Threat in 2012, PANDALABS (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://press.pandasecurity.com/news/privacy-violations-biggest-security-threat-in-2012-reports-
pandalabs/. 
 89.  See United States  v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting 
that “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks”); see JARVIS, supra note 15, at 1–4 (2011). 
 90.  Ludwig, supra note 44.  
 91.  Survey, Plugging the Data Leaks: 2011 Global Information Security Survey, ERNST & 
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of online “hacktivists” such as Anonymous, coupled with the ever-
increasing number of Internet users as well as the increasing number of 
those users who use cloud-based data storage services, the potential for data 
abuse seems to only be growing. 
Skilled identity thieves use a number of techniques to gain access to 
personal information.  Packet sniffing, for example, is the practice of 
intercepting traffic on a network.
92
  The information gained can lead to 
identity theft.
93
  People using free WiFi might be putting themselves at risk 
of identity theft because public connections are less secure than those 
protected by password.
94
  In fact, unprotected wireless signals are a boon to 
those looking to steal identities.
95
  Though most Web sites use encryption 
software to keep credit card numbers safe, hackers can use cookies (tracking 
software) to get access to information—like credit card numbers or bank 
account numbers and passwords—even though you might think you are 
entering it into a secure Web site.
96
  Another way identity thieves gain 
access to information is through the use of a key-logger, software that 
records keystrokes.
97
  If a thief successfully manages to install a key-logger 




Encrypted information also may not be as secure as most people 
presume.  Thanks to advances in computing power, “an individual with a 
modern dual-core processor in a Dell laptop, loaded with the right software, 
can defeat a twenty-year-old encryption algorithm not in a matter of days but 
in a matter of minutes.”
99
  Even the federal government is not immune.  
Identity thieves are skilled at filing fraudulent tax returns.
100
  Last year, the 
                                                          
YOUNG (2011), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Advisory/2011-Global-Information-Security-
Survey—-Plugging-the-data-leaks. 
 92.  Visa Data Security Alert: Top Vulnerability—Packet Sniffing, VISA (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/20090202_packet_sniffing.pdf.   
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Analisa Nazareno, How Free Wi-Fi Can Put You at Risk, MSN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2011, 2:31 
PM), http://money.msn.com/identity-theft/how-free-wi-fi-can-put-you-at-risk-credit-cards.aspx.  
 95.  See VAMOSI, supra note 29, at XVII (explaining the ease with which a wireless signal can 
be cloned: “With no authentication and often with little or no encryption, or with trivial encryption, I 
can become you without ever coming into physical contact with you or your papers or effects.”).   
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Charlie Sorrel, DIY Key-Logger Kit Lets You Spy From Afar, WIRED GADGET LAB BLOG 
(July 23, 2009, 5:05 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/07/diy-key-logger-kit-lets-you-
spy-from-afar.  
 98.  See id. (discussing the ease with which a key-logger can be installed if a person has 
physical access to the computer).  
 99.  VAMOSI, supra note 29, at XIV. 
 100.  Blake Ellis, IRS Pays Billions in Refunds to Identity Thieves, CNN MONEY (Aug. 2, 2012, 
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Internal Revenue Service paid out $5.2 billion in refunds to potentially 
fraudulent tax returns.
101
  Identity thieves can file thousands of tax returns 
just with a fake address—an audit conducted by the Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration found that the same Lansing, Michigan, 
address was used on 2,137 different tax returns.
102
 
C. How the Law Has Responded 
In an attempt to plug these leaks, most state legislatures have enacted 
breach notification laws.  According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands all have data notification laws.
103
  Only Alabama, 
Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota have yet to enact such laws.
104
  
California was the first state to enact such a statute in 2002 and it has 
become something of a model.
105
  It requires companies to disclose any 
breach of computerized data if it includes personal information reasonably 
believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person.
106
  It defines 
“personal information” as a person’s first name, or first initial, in 
combination with the person’s last name and one of the following: social 
security number, driver’s license, an account number, medical information, 
or health insurance information.
107
 
The majority of states follow the California model.
108
  However, some 
laws are less specific on how they impose security obligations.  Take, for 
example, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act—proposed by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and adopted 
by every state except New York, Illinois, and Oregon—a law intended to 
provide some guidance for businesses conducting transactions with e-
signatures.
109
  Some view this law as the beginning of a patchwork of laws 
                                                          
5:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/02/pf/taxes/irs-identity-theft/index.htm. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2012). 
 106.  Id. § 1798.29(a).  
 107.  Id. § 1798.29(g)(1)(A)–(E).  
 108.  See Berinato, supra note 42.  
 109.  Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/uniform-electronic-transactions-acts.aspx. (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014). 
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that will together impose a duty to keep data secured.
110
  However, what the 
law really does is tell companies how to satisfy the requirement to keep a 
record of an electronic transaction when another law requires such a record 
to be kept.
111
  It is an area of the law where confusion reigns. 
In response, commentators have called for the federal government to 
enact an overarching data leak notification law.
112
  Some federal laws do 
require a company or organization to provide security for the information 
they possess.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996 was the first federal law to require healthcare providers to 
secure information belonging to their patients, who are essentially their 
customers.
113
  Three years later, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bililey 
Act (GLB), which placed regulations upon financial businesses.
114
  It 
imposes upon every financial institution “an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security 
and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”
115
  
Each of these laws was followed by security regulations—GLB in 2001 and 
HIPAA in 2003—that instruct companies how to implement the security 
provisions of the acts.
116
 
In addition, in 2002, the FTC began filing enforcement actions against 
companies for allegedly failing to provide adequate security for 
information.
117
  When Congress created the FTC in 1914, it empowered the 
commission to prevent persons, partnerships, and corporations (but not 
banks or credit unions) from engaging in unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.
118
  The theory behind the enforcement actions against companies 
for failing to provide security for personal information was that companies 
claimed to be able to secure data and were therefore engaged in deceptive 
trade practices
119
—an argument that has also frequently arisen in recent 
                                                          
 110.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 21. 
 111.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.12(a) (West 2000).  
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 113.  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (1996).  
 114.  15 U.S.C. § 6801 (1999).  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 24–25. 
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 118.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 119.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 24–25. 
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class action suits.
120
  In June 2005, the FTC began claiming that a failure to 
provide adequate security was an unfair trade practice, even in the absence 
of any false representation as to the company’s security prowess.
121
  Some 




The law internationally has developed at a faster rate than the law in 
America.  In Europe, the European Union Data Protection Directive 
mandates that all companies possessing personal information have a general 
duty to protect it.
123
  Article 17(1) of the Directive tells Member States that 
they must adopt legislation that requires those who control data to protect it: 
Member States shall provide that the controller must implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal 
data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the 
processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and 
against all other unlawful forms of processing. 
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their 
implementation, such measures shall ensure a level of security 
appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of 
the data to be protected.
124
 
Other countries—like Canada, Japan, Argentina, South Korea, Hong Kong, 




Some United States courts have recognized something like a duty to 
protect consumer data, leading some commentators to believe that the trend 
in the law is headed toward courts generally recognizing the duty.
126
  For 
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 123.  Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 17(1) (1995), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:NOT (last visited Mar. 20, 
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example, the Michigan Court of Appeals found in 2005 that a union owed a 
duty to protect the personal information of its members.
127
  In Catsouras v. 
Department of California Highway Patrol, the California Court of Appeals 
found a somewhat similar duty when it said that Highway Patrol officers 
owed a duty to the family of an accident victim not to post graphic pictures 
of the deceased online for “lurid titillation.”
128
  A Minnesota court also 
allowed a company to concede that, because of its own policies, the 
company owed customers a duty of reasonable care with information.
129
  A 
United States district court in Tennessee found in an identity theft case that a 
financial institution owed a duty to verify the “authenticity and accuracy” of 
an application for a credit card when injury is foreseeable and 
preventable.
130
  Finally, a bankruptcy court has found that the security of 




The proliferation of data leaks along with the growing belief that 
companies owe a duty to protect that information has led to the rise of large 
class-action lawsuits seeking damages.  On April 28, 2009, a Starbucks 
employee filed suit against the company on behalf of a class alleging 
“failure to adequately safeguard its employees’ sensitive, personal 
information, including social security numbers.”
132
  The lawsuit involved the 
theft of one laptop that contained information on approximately 97,000 
employees.
133
  The complaint contended that it is now industry standard to 
encrypt such data and that the company’s “failure to maintain reasonable and 
adequate security procedures to protect against the theft of . . . [personally 
identifiable information] has put Plaintiff and the proposed Class Members 
at an increased and imminent risk of becoming victims of identity theft 
                                                          
 127.  Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty, Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 1023, 
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 131.  In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
 132.  Complaint at ¶1, Lalli v. Starbucks Corp., No. C09-00389 (RAJ), 2009 WL 5072589 (W.D. 
Wash. 2009).  
 133.  Id. at ¶83. 
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crimes, fraud, and abuse.”
134
  The complaint alleged that Starbucks had a 
common law duty to protect its employees’ personal information and by not 
conforming to industry standards, it breached that duty.
135
 
In early 2012, a Zappos.com (Zappos) customer filed a class-action suit 
against the online retailer in response to a hack that may have exposed 
partial credit card numbers of 24 million customers.
136
  The suit alleged that 
Zappos owed a duty to keep customer information “in a safe and secure 
condition” away from the threat of unknown third persons.
137
  It recently 
survived a motion to compel arbitration, filed by Zappos, along with co-
defendant Amazon (the world’s largest online retailer),
138
 based on an 
arbitration clause in the Zappos Terms of Use.
139
  Ultimately, because the 
agreed upon arbitration Terms of Use was illusory and a “highly 
inconspicuous link buried in a sea of links,” the court found that the Terms 




In 2012, a user of the online professional networking Web site LinkedIn 
filed a class-action complaint against that company following a data leak of 
approximately 6.5 million customers’ information, including e-mail 
addresses, passwords, and log-in credentials.
141
  Like the Starbucks 
complaint, this complaint also alleged that a company possessing personal 
data failed to comply with industry protection standards.
142
  The complaint 
included several causes of action, one being negligence or gross 
negligence.
143
  It reads: “By agreeing to accept Plaintiff and the other Class 
and SubClass members’ sensitive [personally identifiable information], 
Defendant assumed a duty, which required it to exercise reasonable care to 
secure and safeguard that information and to utilize industry standard 
protocols and technology to do so.”
144
 
In response to the threat of leaving data unsecured, many companies had 
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already taken it upon themselves to take steps to increase the security of 
customer data.
145
  Some companies have even taken it a step farther and 
asked the federal government to step in.  For example, in a 2005 position 
paper, Microsoft Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate 
Secretary Brad Smith called on the federal government to enact privacy 
legislation to protect consumers.
146
  So far, the federal government has 
declined to do so. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Because of the growing threat of identity theft due to data leaks coming 
from companies, the law must respond in an effective manner.  Information 
security has been called “a time bomb waiting to explode.”
147
  But the ever-
expanding body of law
148
 addressing data security has failed to plug the 
leaks, as evidenced by the fact that in early 2014, retail giant Target 
announced a leak that may affect up to 110 million customers.
149
  The Target 
leak is one of a number of high-profile data leaks threatening millions of 
people with harm.
150
  In order to address this growing problem, courts 
should begin recognizing a duty to protect customer data that would allow 
customers to sue companies for negligence following a breach. 
Courts could most effectively do this by: 1) acknowledging that identity 
theft is a foreseeable result of a data leak or by considering their gathering of 
data as an undertaking to provide protection, 2) clearly defining what 
constitutes reasonable efforts to protect data, 3) limiting liability by 
requiring actual harm, and 4) requiring that the leak be the proximate cause 
of the harm. 
A.  The Basics of a Negligence Claim 
At its most basic, a complaint that alleges that a party had a duty and 
failed to adequately perform that duty is a tort action for negligence.
151
  The 
elements of negligence are: 1) the existence of a duty, 2) breach of that duty, 
3) said breach caused an alleged injury, 4) and said injury resulted in 
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damages.
152
  Generally, a legal duty is “the obligation to conform to a 
standard of conduct under the law for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risks of harm.”
153
  The duty to protect consumer data would go 
beyond this standard because it would impose an affirmative duty to take 
action to prevent harm from happening.  This is rare in tort law.
154
  As 
University of Arizona College of Law professor Dan Dobbs explains: 
Unless the defendant has assumed a duty to act, or stands in a special 
relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort for a pure 
failure to act for the plaintiff’s benefit.  The fact that the defendant 
foresees harm to a particular individual from his failure to act does not 
change the general rule.
155
 
This general rule has its critics and loopholes.  Some have argued, at 
least, that courts should impose a duty upon people to assist in the case of an 
emergency.
156
  Also, courts are more likely to find an affirmative duty if 
they find that two parties had a special relationship
157
 or that one undertook 
to render services to another.
158
  In addition, courts historically are reluctant 
to extend negligence law to financial losses.
159
 
Negligence actions require that the breach be the legal, or proximate 
cause as well as the cause-in-fact of the harm.
160
  Proximate cause, in a way, 
is a limit on liability based primarily on foreseeability.
161
  Think, for 
example, of the Butterfly Effect—the theory that the flapping wing of a 
butterfly on one continent can set off a chain reaction that can alter the 
weather patterns on another continent and lead to a tornado.
162
  There, the 
butterfly would be the cause-in-fact of the tornado, but would not be legally 
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PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908) (explaining that the law has not recognized a duty to aid the 
unfortunate). 
  155.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 853 (2000). 
 156.  Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 439, 520 (1994).  
 157.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).  
 158.  Id. § 324A. 
 159.  See, e.g., Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 241 (Wis. 2004) (applying 
the economic-loss doctrine, a “judicially-created remedies principle that operates generally to 
preclude contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses” 
to bar a tort claim). 
 160.  DOBBS, supra note 155, at 443.  
 161.  Id. at 444.  
 162.  Larry Bradley, The Butterfly Effect, CHAOS & FRACTALS (2010), 
http://www.stsci.edu/~lbradley/seminar/butterfly.html. 
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held responsible because the tornado is not a foreseeable consequence.  An 
important aspect of proximate cause law is the concept of the superseding 
cause.
163
  When a second actor’s unforeseeable action causes an injury, the 
second actor is solely liable.
164
  When the second actor is a criminal, courts 
may impose a heightened standard of foreseeability.
165
  The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals explained that “heightened foreseeability factors 
directly into the duty analysis because a defendant is only liable for the 
intervening criminal acts of another ‘if the criminal act is so foreseeable that 
a duty arises to guard against it.’”
166
  In essence, the law of negligence 
allows courts flexibility to find a cause of action and tools to limit recovery 
to those who really deserve it. 
B.  Recent Case Law Makes It Clear that a Duty to Protect Customer Data 
Likely Does Not Yet Exist 
Most courts have not specifically said that companies have a duty to 
protect customers’ personal data.  The Federal District of Nevada came 
close, however.  The court declined to grant summary judgment in the 
Zappos litigation, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations that Zappos had 
failed to properly safeguard its customers’ personal data sufficiently support 
the breach element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
167
  In reaching this 
determination, the court stated that Zappos owed its customers a duty to act 
reasonably and prudentially, implying that failure to safeguard customers’ 
personal data could be considered to be unreasonable or imprudent 
behavior.
168  Other courts have found security of data to be legally 
important.  For example, in In re Vee Vinhnee,
169
 the Ninth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel was faced with the problem of determining if a 
digital business record could be admitted into evidence as an exception to 
the hearsay rule.
170
  The court relied on Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried’s 
eleven-step foundation for determining if a paper record should be 
                                                          
 163.  DOBBS, supra note 155, at 444.  
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C. 
2009).  
 166.  Id. at 871 (quoting McKethan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 588 A.2d 708, 717 
(D.C. 1991)). 
 167.  In re Zappos.com, No. 3:12-CV-00325-RJC-VPC, 2013 WL 4830497, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 
9, 2013). 
 168. Id. 
 169.  336 B.R. 437 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).  
 170.  Id. at 444.  
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admissible
171
 saying that the ultimate determination for a computerized 
record would be the same, writing: “[I]t all boils down to the same question 
of assurance that the record is what it purports to be.”
172
  The court drew 
attention to Prof. Imwinkelried’s fourth step—“The procedure has built-in 
safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors[]”—saying that the step 
“warrants amplification” and is “more complex than first appears.”
173
  The 
court ultimately upheld the trial court’s decision not to allow computer 
evidence into the record, stating that the declaration included: 
no information regarding American Express’ computer policy and 
system control procedures, including control of access to the pertinent 
databases, control of access to the pertinent programs, recording and 
logging of changes to the data, backup practices, and audit procedures 
utilized to assure the continuing integrity of the records.  All of these 
matters are pertinent to the accuracy of the computer in the retention 
and retrieval of the information at issue.
174
 
Therefore, in paying specific attention to “system control procedures,” 
the court made it clear that the level of security associated with electronic 
records has legal significance, at least with regard to allowing such records 
into evidence.  The court in essence required a showing of safeguards prior 
to allowing computerized evidence into the record.
175
  Some believe that the 
level of security around such records will continue to be an important factor 
in whether they will be admissible.
176
  However, though this is evidence that 
the security level of data will occasionally be of import to courts, it fails to 
indicate that the Ninth Circuit would be willing to go further and recognize a 
duty to protect customer data.  In fact, the best it can hope to do is give an 
indication that courts might use Prof. Imwinkelried’s test to determine if a 
company had taken reasonable efforts to secure data. 
Though some have claimed that case law on this subject indicates a 
growing trend toward businesses owing a duty to protect customer data,
177
 
this is not necessarily the case.  In fact, though some courts have taken baby 
steps in that direction—occasionally mentioning the growing threat of 
identity theft as part of their decision-making process
178
—they are careful to 
                                                          
 171.  EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.03 [2] (5th ed. 2002). 
 172.  Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 445. 
 173.  Id. at 446. 
 174.  Id. at 449. 
 175.  Id. at 446–47. 
 176.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 26. 
 177.  Id. at 24. 
 178.  See Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting the 
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point out that their holdings are limited to the facts at hand and seem 
reluctant to set such a precedent.
179
 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan found in Bell v. Michigan Council 
that the union did owe a duty to protect its members from identity theft “by 
providing some safeguards to ensure the security of their most essential 
confidential identifying information.”
180
  The plaintiffs in Bell—911 
operators employed by the City of Detroit and members of the local union—
all were victims of identity theft in 1999.
181
  However, the data leak that 
occurred in Bell had nothing to do with the Internet or digital data.  There, 
data thieves gained access to the plaintiffs’ Social Security numbers the old 
fashioned way: an employee’s daughter found a notebook with the Social 
Security numbers of the county’s 911 operators.
182
  In addition, the court 
specifically said it was limiting its holding to cases where the defendant 
knew confidential information was leaving the building and there were no 
procedures in place to protect that information.
183
 
Furthermore, Bell does not involve a company.  The court found that the 
union owed a duty, but a union and a member have a different relationship 
than a company and a customer.  The opinion mentioned that membership in 
the union was essentially mandatory,
184
 whereas customers have the choice 
to do business with any company they so choose.  Another factor keeping 
this case from standing for the assertion that there is a duty to protect 
customer data is that it is an unpublished opinion, and therefore, not even 
binding on lower Michigan courts. 
The case Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp.,
185
 which some 
contend stands for the assertion that a duty of care may be established by 
                                                          
increase in identity theft and characterizing banks and credit card issuers as “the first, and often last, 
line of defense in preventing the devastating damage that identity theft inflicts”); Bell v. Mich. 
Council 25 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty, & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 
2005 WL 356306, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (noting that “[t]he crime of identity theft has 
been gaining momentum in recent years due to the accessibility of identifying personal information, 
mainly through computer use”).  
 179.  See, e.g., Wolfe, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (recognizing a duty but stating that it “merely 
requires Defendant to implement reasonable and cost-effective verification methods that can prevent 
criminals, in some instances, from obtaining a credit card with a stolen identity”); Bell, 2005 WL 
356306, at *5 (limiting its holding to “the facts of this case where defendant knew confidential 
information was leaving its premises and no procedures were in place to ensure the security of the 
information”).  
 180.  Bell, 2005 WL 356306, at *5.  
 181.  Id. at *1. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at *5. 
 184.  Id at *1.  
 185.  No. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). 
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statute,
186
 in fact stands for only the assertion that a company can concede 
that its own policies can create a duty to keep private information 
confidential.
187
  There, a student loan company, Brazos Higher Education 
Service (Brazos), informed customers that its data might have been 
compromised.  An employee suffered a break-in and a laptop that might 
have included some sensitive customer data was among the items stolen.
188
  
Brazos’s privacy policy promised to “restrict access to nonpublic personal 
information to authorized persons who need to know such information.”
189
  
A customer sued Brazos following the data leak, arguing, in part, that Brazos 
violated a statutory duty created by the GLB Act.  However, there was never 
any indication that he or any other customer experienced any fraud or 
identity theft as a result of the leak.
190
  The company conceded, for the 
purposes of a summary judgment motion only, that the GLB Act and its own 
policy required it to provide reasonable care,
191
 but argued that it did provide 
such care.
192
  The court agreed, noting that a break-in in a safe neighborhood 
is not foreseeable.
193
  Furthermore, the court pointed out that the customer 
did not suffer any harm.
194




So, rather than saying that the company owed the customer a duty 
because of the GLB Act, the Brazos court allowed the company to impose a 
duty upon itself.  The court simply chose not to disagree with the company 
and examined the rest of the negligence claim, which it quickly disposed of, 
finding no breach or harm: hardly a ringing endorsement for the existence of 
a duty to protect consumer information tort. 
Even when courts have specifically found a duty to protect customers 
from identity theft, that duty has not been in regard to the collection, storage, 
and protection of consumer data.  For example, the court in Wolfe v. MBNA 
America Bank
196
 found that the bank owed a duty to the plaintiff to verify 
                                                          
 186.  Smedinghoff, supra note 41, at 26. 
 187.  See Guin, 2006 WL 288483, at *4  (“Brazos concedes that under this policy, it owed Guin 
a duty of reasonable care, but argues that it acted with reasonable care in handling Guin’s personal 
information. (citation omitted) The Court agrees.”). 
 188.  Id. at *2. 
 189.  Id. at *4. 
 190.  Id. at *2. 
 191.  Id. at *4. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at *6. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  485 F. Supp. 2d 874 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).  
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the authenticity of the information included in a credit card application.
197
  
The court even cited the increasing risk of identity theft as part of its 
decision.
198
  However, the court stressed that it was not imposing a duty 
upon the bank to prevent all identity theft.
199
  There, the bank issued a credit 
card to a person using the plaintiff’s name but an address where the plaintiff 
was not living and had never lived.
200
  The court said that whether the bank 
had violated that duty was a question for the trier of fact.
201
 
By analogy, one could claim that by recognizing a duty to protect 
customers in certain situations from identity theft, the Wolfe court would 
also recognize a duty to protect information that could be used for identity 
theft.  However, it seems unlikely that the Wolfe court itself would stand 
behind that proposition.  It made sure to specify that it was not imposing a 
duty on a company to prevent identity theft, saying: “this duty to verify does 
not impose . . . a duty to prevent all identity theft.”
202
  It is much more likely 
that the court was imposing a duty to take some basic steps prior to issuing a 
credit card.  If the company in Wolfe had simply checked the address on the 
application, no identity theft would have occurred. 
Thus, security and safeguards surrounding electronic data have become 
important legal concepts, yet companies probably do not have a legal duty to 
provide such security or safeguards. 
C.  The Relationship Between a Company and a Customer May Give Rise to 
an Affirmative Duty 
The general rule that tort law does not require one to take action to 
prevent harm befalling another is rarely excepted, often only when there is a 
“special relationship” between the two parties.
203
  The classic example of a 
special relationship is that of parent and child.  Parents, the law has long 
observed, owe a duty to their children to provide a minimum of care.
204
  For 
example, in 1992, the Sixth Circuit found that a surrogacy broker owed an 
affirmative duty to reduce the risk of harm to the child, surrogate mother, 
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 882.  
 198.  See id.   
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 878. 
 201.  Id. at 882. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  DOBBS, supra note 155, at 853–54. 
 204.  See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 342–43 (N.Y. 1974) (discussing the many 
duties that arise from the parent–child relationship).   
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and contracting father.
205
  The law also recognizes several other 
relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty.  For example, a common 
carrier has a duty to protect passengers against unreasonable risk and 
provide care if they are harmed.
206
  The same is true for the relationship 
between an innkeeper and guest, a possessor of land open to the public and 
members of the public on that land, and one who voluntarily takes custody 
of another.
207
  With the rise of identity theft in the United States and the 
growth of the Internet,
208
 has the time come to say that when a company 
collects and possesses customer personal information there is a special 
relationship that gives rise to an affirmative duty? 
Certainly, some business relationships give rise to an affirmative duty.  
It has already been mentioned that common carriers have a duty to their 
passengers, and innkeepers have a duty to their guests.  However, is the 
relationship between a company and consumer similar enough to extend a 
duty by analogy?  Some courts recognize that businesses have a special 
relationship with customers when they are on the premises of a business.
209
  
Here, a company is taking possession of personal data and moving it to a 
holding area—usually a server—somewhat like a common carrier.  But this 
is a tenuous relationship at best.  Or, is it that in an increasingly digital 
world—one in which people preparing a will are now urged to consider the 
fate of their online identities once their physical being has gone
210
—a 
company that takes possession of personal information is, in some ways, 
acting as an innkeeper for that digital identity?  To take it a step further, 
when a company gathers personal information on one of its customers—
information like name, address, social security number, passwords, etc.—is 
the company voluntarily taking care of that customer’s online avatar?  At the 
least, we can recognize that identity in the digital age is a fluid and changing 
concept. 
Perhaps the best way for a court to come to the conclusion that it should 
                                                          
 205.  Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 1992).  
 206.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See supra Part II.B.  
 209.  See, e.g., Morris v. De La Torre, 113 P.3d 1182, 1188 (Cal. 2005) (saying that “a proprietor 
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disregard the general tort law rule that entities are not required to take action 
to prevent harm befalling another is to say that when a company receives, 
gathers, and stores personal information on its customers it has undertaken 
to render services necessary for the protection of the person or his or her 
things.
211
  Take, for example, the court in Guin v. Brazos, which relied on 
the existence of safeguards as an indication that the company used 
reasonable care to rule in favor of the company.
212
  Are those safeguards not 
an undertaking? 
The problem with all of these approaches is that affirmative duties 
historically recognized by tort law require the powerful party in the special 
relationship to protect only against unreasonable risk of physical harm.
213
  
No physical harm could possibly come from a company–customer 
relationship that takes place in its entirety online.  Identity theft may have 
horrible consequences for its victims,
214
 but it is a financial crime in nature.  
That being said, courts have found affirmative duties in a variety of 
instances.  It should not be difficult to find such a duty, especially in 
conjunction with the forthcoming section. 
D. Data Thefts Are Foreseeable 
Identity theft is foreseeable when a data leak occurs that includes 
personal information.  As has been established, one of the reasons that courts 
have been so reluctant to recognize such a duty is likely because traditional 
tort law loathes imposing affirmative duties upon others to protect 
individuals.
215
  In 1908, University of Pennsylvania legal scholar Francis H. 
Bohlen stated that “[t]here is no distinction more deeply rooted in common 
law” than the difference between active misconduct and passive inaction.
216
  
However, as already demonstrated, courts do occasionally find affirmative 
duties, especially if there is a special relationship or an undertaking between 
the two parties.  But, to some courts, foreseeability of risk is the most 
                                                          
 211.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (assigning liability to one who 
causes harm as a result of one’s negligent performance of an undertaking).  
 212.  Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *4 
(D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); see also Complaint, Szpyrka, supra note 80 (claiming that LinkedIn 
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 214.  See infra Part III.F. 
 215.  See supra Part III.C. 
 216.  Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 
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important part of the test to determine if there is a duty.
217
  For example, the 
Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas said that the “question of duty turns on the 
foreseeability of harmful consequences, which is the underlying basis for 
negligence.”
218
  The California Court of Appeals for the First District has 
said: “As a general principle, a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons 
who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks 
which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.”‘
219
  With regard to 
identity theft, at least one court has indicated that identity theft is a 
foreseeable result of a data leak.
220
  In Cobell v. Norton, the United States 
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, treated data theft as a 
foreseeable consequence in its analysis of an injunction that prevented the 
federal government from connecting a database of trust accounts of 500,000 
Native Americans to a network until the government could prove that the 
network was secure.
221
  Though the court never used the word foreseeable 
and vacated the injunction on procedural grounds, it stated that “the 




Though Cobell here stands for the assertion that identity theft can be 
foreseeable, it must be pointed out that the court found that the parties in 
Cobell had a special fiduciary relationship.  In Cobell, the Secretary of the 
Interior and the other defendants were trustees of funds held in trust for half 
a million Native Americans.
223
  Nevertheless, this did not change the trial 
court’s support for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
until a Special Master certified that all the data was secure.
224
 
In a quasi-judicial administrative hearing, the Maine Public Utilities 
Commission found that an attack by a program called a “worm” was 
foreseeable.
225
  The commission found that the company, Verizon, had 
sufficient warning about the worm and failed to take action to secure its 
                                                          
 217.  See Giraldo v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008).  
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systems.
226
  There, the damage the worm caused was disruption of 
service.
227
  Why would a worm that interrupts service be foreseeable but a 
hacker bent on identity theft not be foreseeable?  Hackers often use 
programs such as worms, viruses, and key-loggers to gain access to personal 
information.
228
  Would the commission really suggest that an identity thief 
gaining information through the use of a worm is foreseeable, but one 
gaining information due to a key-logger is not?  There is little difference 
between a foreseeable worm that disrupts service and a foreseeable hacker 
that steals information. 
The foreseeability of identity theft is a concept that is dancing on the 
fringes of legality.  It is time for courts to recognize the foreseeability of 
identity theft.  It is one of the fastest growing crimes in the country,
229
 and 
has negatively affected millions of Americans during the last decade with no 
signs of abating.
230
  Another indicator that data leaks are becoming rapidly 
foreseeable is the efforts that companies make to prevent such losses.  Many 
companies have policies in place to protect data.
231
  Ironic though it may be, 
those seeking to recover from companies where data had leaked are alleging 
that the very existence of safeguards to prevent data leaks is evidence that 
those leaks were foreseeable.  For example, the complaint against LinkedIn 
claimed the leak was foreseeable “particularly in light of the fact that 
protections necessary to secure and safeguard databases were well-known 
within the industry and had been successfully used to protect sensitive 
[personally identifiable information] for years prior to this breach.”
232
 
Here we have companies taking the initiative to gather, collect, and store 
valuable information—perhaps without adequate security—that is 
potentially extremely damaging in the wrong hands.  Recent events have 
proven that this information has a tendency to leak.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to say that these companies should foresee the risk of identity 
theft and take steps to prevent it. 
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E. Defining Reasonable Efforts 
If courts do choose to recognize a common law duty to protect 
consumer data, as this Comment is suggesting, a judicially created standard 
should only require companies to take reasonable efforts, giving the 
companies a defense to potentially huge claims and unreasonable liability.  
Imagine, for example, that a large company collects certain information 
about its customers and keeps that information on networked computers.  
The company pays the best computer programmers it can find a competitive 
wage to encrypt the information.  It also provides other security measures 
like passwords and firewalls.  Nevertheless, these security measures fail, and 
a hacker gains access to potentially damaging information.  Should that 
company be liable? 
It should not.  Hackers make it a point to stay one step ahead of the 
security measures seeking to defeat them.
233
  As former Justice Department 
official Mark Rasch opined: “Only the dumb ones get caught.”
234
  It is 
unreasonable to think that companies would have to protect against the 
world’s most skilled computer hacker, just like it would be unreasonable to 
hold a museum liable after getting hit by the world’s greatest cat burglar.  
That being said, it is not enough that companies take minimal efforts to 
protect personal information.  Courts should require reasonable efforts. 
Reasonable, in this case, should be defined by the industry standard.
235
  
The complaint against LinkedIn gives an idea of what the industry standard 
is currently.
236
  It describes a process called adding “salt” to a password 
before storing passwords in a hashing format.
237
  Hash functions are 
algorithms that create a unique representation of information, known as a 
hash value, which can act as a stand-in for a stored password.
238
  “Salting” 
refers to a process of assigning random values to the password before 
running it through the hashing algorithm.
239
  More common and secure than 
                                                          
 233.  See, e.g., Michael J. Martinez, Microsoft Watched but Couldn’t Catch Hacker, ABCNEWS 
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=119324&page=1 (detailing the 
company’s efforts to track down a hacker who’d gained access to code for a product in development 
for about 12 days).  
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Cf. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 551 (Cal. 1991).  The 
defense is analogous to the “state-of-the-art” defense raised in this products liability case.  
Companies use it to assert that “even those at the vanguard of scientific knowledge at the time the 
products were sold could not have known” of the risk.  Id.  
 236.  Complaint, Szpyrka, supra note 80, at ¶¶16–19. 
 237.  Id. at ¶17. 
 238.  CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY 293 (2010).  
 239.  Complaint, Szpyrka, supra note 80, at ¶17.  
  
2014] INCREASING SECURITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 843 
that is to salt the password before reducing it to a hash format and then salt 
the resulting hash value before storing the information on a separate and 
secure server.
240




What is clear—and possibly the only thing that is clear—from this 
description is that courts could easily find themselves mired in a pit of 
jargon if they marry themselves to a specific procedure, especially since 
procedures are likely to change with technology.  It should be enough to 
require an industry standard and indicate that it can be shown by expert 
testimony.  In addition, when courts recognize industry standards as 
evidence of reasonable efforts toward securing data, they should stress that 
industry standards are likely to change and that the security requirements 
may be tighter or looser depending on the type of data and how significant 
the risk of identity theft would be if it were to leak.  For example, say a 
hacker wrote and distributed a program that could easily defeat the salting 
and hashing methods of protecting data discussed previously.
242
  If salting 
and hashing continued to be the industry standard even though there were 
more secure methods available to protect data, the courts would likely find 
adherence to the industry standard falls below the amount of protection 
required by the duty. 
Therefore, by requiring reasonable efforts, courts can insure that 
companies go far enough to protect data, while still providing them with a 
defense to a claim that would arise in the event of a security breach that 
could not reasonably be prevented. 
F. Requiring a Showing of Actual Harm and Proximate Cause 
Another way to limit the liability of this new cause of action is to 
require actual harm and proximate cause.  Of the many recent lawsuits filed 
against large companies in the wake of huge data leaks, most allege only that 
information leaked, not that those involved actually had their identities 
stolen.
243
  There is no doubt that the plaintiffs in these suits have gone 
through stressful times and had to take quick action due to the data leaks.
244
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But, if these people have not faced serious adverse consequences, such as 
having their identities stolen, they are the wrong group of plaintiffs.  The 
plaintiffs filing these lawsuits claim a company is liable simply for the fact 
that information made its way out into the larger world even though no real 
harm has come from it.  Though this Comment argues that courts should 
recognize a company’s duty to its customers to protect their data, liability 
must be limited if it is to be an equitable solution.  Holding a company 
responsible for every single instance of personal information leaking out to 
the Internet casts far too wide a net.  When the leaks occur, they often 
involve millions of customers.
245
  Making a company liable to every 
customer who has data leaked is an untenable solution.  Such an all-
encompassing cause of action imposes too much liability on companies and 
would make it much harder, if not impossible, for them to do business 
online. 
Such a huge cause of action puts the jury in a difficult situation as well.  
Say, for example, that the 110 million customers affected by the Target 
leak—though there has been no evidence of identity theft—band together, 
file a class-action lawsuit, and win.  How does the jury then make that class 
whole?  Let’s say the jury is generous and requires the company to pay out 
$110 million to the class.  That’s $1 per person, not including attorney fees.  
But an award large enough to impact the entire class is also likely to be so 
large it could cripple the company—all for a leak that, in the end, proved 
harmless. 
That is why a showing of actual harm must be required.  If a customer 
does suffer identity theft, it should not be difficult to show such harm.  
Identity theft can be extremely damaging.  Robert S. Lasnik, Chief Judge of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington—
while sentencing a Starbucks employee found guilty of taking part in an 
identity theft ring in 2006—took the opportunity to highlight some of the 
damage that an identity thief can do.
246
  He said, “identity theft can create 
huge emotional problems for people.  We often think of bank fraud as just 
against a bank or just money, but it damages real people.”
247
  Identity theft, 
he added, breaks up families by causing rifts between husbands and 
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wives.
248
  Judge Lasnik left out plenty of the ills of identity theft.  The U.S. 
Social Security Administration will issue a new social security number to a 
victim of identity theft,
249
 but it is no cure-all.  The Social Security 
Administration does not destroy the old number and files the new with the 
old, to ensure that the person receives credit for earnings under the old 
number.
250
  In addition, getting faulty information off a credit report is a 
difficult and time-consuming process.
251
  Three main companies are 
responsible for keeping track of your credit report: Equifax, Experian, and 
TransUnion.
252
  The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires these companies to 
provide a free copy of one’s credit report upon request.
253
  To make such a 
request, one must provide his or her name, address, social security number, 
and date of birth.
254
  That’s the easy part.  If something on the report is 
wrong, one must tell the reporting company in writing—sent by certified 
mail—exactly what is wrong, and provide copies of documents that support 
this contention.
255
  The company will then conduct its own investigation, 
usually within thirty days, in which it works with the company that provided 
the inaccurate information.
256
  For example, take a victim of identity theft 
who had a maxed-out and overdue credit card show up on their credit report 
that was actually applied for and used by the identity thief.  That victim 
would be at the mercy of the credit reporting company and the company 
issuing the credit card to sort out what actually occurred.  If the investigation 
does not solve the problem, one can ask for a statement of dispute to be 
included in his or her file.
257
  The frustration of this process can lead to 
social ills.  Identity theft leads to stress and feelings of insecurity.
258
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That harm must also be proximate.  A cause of action such as this 
should not subject a company to never-ending liability.  There must be a 
cutoff point from which a person cannot recover.  For example, if there is a 
leak and a person’s information is included in the leak, then twenty years 
pass before their identity is stolen, that person should not be able to recover.  
When faced with this uniquely challenging modern problem of liability for 
large data leaks, courts should fall back on the basics of tort law to 
determine whether the duty exists.  Since Palsgraff v. Long Island R. Co., 
courts have followed Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo’s axiom to ask if “there 
was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect.”
259
 
It should be remembered that once the identity theft is discovered, the 
vast amount of the burden of identity theft falls on the customer’s financial 
institution.
260
  Chief Judge Lasnik eloquently explained the ills of identity 
theft while sentencing the Starbucks employee to fifty-four months in 
prison.
261
  But, that was a criminal matter.  He was not indicating the type of 
damages that a court should recognize in a civil suit for negligence. 
The type of damage alleged in the most recent data leak complaints 
tends to be unspecific.  In the LinkedIn case, for example, the complaint 
alleged that the harm befell the class suing the company because their 
personal information was “subject to public disclosure without consent” and 
that they “lost money in the form of monthly fees.”
262
  Nowhere does the 
complaint allege that the victims of the data leak had also become victims of 
identity theft.  Indeed, what occurred during this leak was that hackers 
posted hashed passwords online in their hashed format, however, the 
complaint alleges that the hashing was not salted and therefore weak, 
allowing people to break the code within a few hours.
263
 
Here we have a clear demarcation of what the courts should recognize 
as actual harm and what they should not.  The mere posting of data online 
that may or may not be useful to nefarious individuals is not enough to 
maintain a cause of action.  However, the showing of actual financial loss, as 
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the LinkedIn complaint alleged with regard to monthly fees,
264
 is an example 
of actual damages. 
The classic example would be one of a company losing control of 
personal information either by accident or through the efforts of a computer 
hacker, and that information making its way to an identity thief who 
thereafter used it to obtain a credit card in a customer’s name.  Courts should 
recognize a cause of action against the company with regard to the amount 
of money lost due to the falsely issued credit card, the value to the customer 
of any decline in credit rating, and damages to make the victim whole again.  
The value of a decline in credit rating should be a question for the jury. 
In essence, courts must exercise caution in recognizing this duty to 
prevent the leak itself from being considered the damage that completes the 
tort.  Rather, the customer has a claim only when actual damage, such as 
identity theft, occurs as a result of the leak and that damage is proximate to 
the leak. 
G.  The Cause of Action 
In summation, there should be a cause of action against companies that 
negligently fail to protect customer data.  When confronted with this issue a 
court should make the following ruling: A company that through the 
ordinary course of business collects, stores, analyzes, and uses customer 
personal information—defined as a collection of information such as the 
customer’s name, address, passwords, social security number, credit and 
bank account numbers, and the like—has an affirmative duty to take 
reasonable efforts to provide security for said information.  A company 
breaching that duty is liable to those customers who suffered actual harm, 
such as being a victim of identity theft, as a result of the breach. 
This cause of action gives companies and consumers a clear sense of 
what standards apply.  It does not open companies up to so much liability 
that they would feel the need to cease their data gathering practices.  It 
merely requires them to take reasonable efforts, likely defined by the 
industry standard, provided, of course, that the industry standard is not itself 
negligent.  In addition, it may even work to companies’ advantage if 
customers feel more confident sharing their personal information online. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the digital age, the economy runs on information.
265
  A recent spate of 
high-profile data leaks has made it clear that leaks of personal information 
stored by large companies are a problem that will likely continue.
266
  With 
the rise of identity theft in the new millennium, that information must be 
protected from those who would seek to use it for nefarious purposes.  As 
commentator Thomas J. Smedinghoff argues, “The privacy of a person’s 
data is illusory at best if there is no security for the data.”
267
 
Companies leaking customer information, whether by accident or due to 
the actions of Internet hackers, remain a significant social ill that seems to be 
growing in scope.
268
  Legislative efforts to plug these leaks have primarily 
focused on leak notification laws at the state level and federal laws 
concerning categories of data (e.g., HIPAA (concerning medical 
information) and GLB Act (financial)).
269
  The easiest and best solution to 
this problem would be for courts to create a stronger incentive for companies 
to protect this data by recognizing that companies have a duty to keep 
information from getting into the wrong hands.  Though case law may be 
headed in the direction of courts imposing a duty upon companies to protect 
consumer data, a la the European strategy for preventing data leaks, courts 
have gone to great effort to limit their rulings to the specific facts before 
them and therefore not create a precedent on this significant issue.
270
 
Courts should recognize a cause of action for victims of data leaks first, 
by admitting that identity theft is a foreseeable risk when such data is leaked; 
second, by defining how a company can take reasonable efforts to protect 
data in terms of industry standards; and third, by limiting liability by 
requiring actual harm.
271
   
The word “leak” often is misleading when referring to the amount of 
data in question.  Often, it is more like a torrent impacting millions of 
people.
272
  It would be foolish to hold companies liable to each and every 
person, especially if no one is actually harmed.  This change in the law, 
although it imposes an affirmative duty upon companies to protect 
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individuals, is necessary in the digital age. 
 
 
